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Social constructionism is a powerful weapon in the armoury of critical sociology.1
Consider the impact of Simone de Beauvoir’s analysis of what we now call the so-
cial construction of gender (Beauvoir, 1997 [1949]): by demonstrating that some-
thing which previously was thought of as natural and unchanging is in fact socially
constructed, she opened up gender to the challenges of feminism. To some extent,
such tactics are generalisable: when we show that something is socially con-
structed, it becomes clear that it could be constructed differently, and then we can
start to demand changes in it (Hacking, 2000: 6-7).
But social constructionism has often been linked, by both its practitioners and
its critics, to an anti-realist ontology of the social world. In privileging language, dis-
course, and/or culture as the source of social constructions, constructionism has of-
ten seemed to stand in opposition to a variety of realist claims: that the social world is
open to causal explanations, that social structures are causally powerful, and even
on occasion to the idea that we inhabit a real material world that extends beyond us
and can act upon us. In its most extreme form, everything becomes a social construc-
tion, and there is nothing else we can know of the world (Elder-Vass, 2012: chapter
12). Yet such a view undermines the critical potential of constructionism, as it de-
prives us of any basis on which to make judgements between alternative construc-
tions. If constructionism is taken to undermine the reliability of all knowledge claims
and all ethical claims, as some constructionists believe, then it also undermines its
own knowledge claims and ethical claims.2
This paper proceeds from the belief that social constructionism’s potential is
best realised by separating it from the anti-realist baggage it has often been ex-
pected to carry, and linking it instead to an explicitly realist ontology of the social
world: the philosophy of critical realism, developed originally by Roy Bhaskar
(1975; 1998 [1979]) and adopted by a range of sociologists (e.g. Archer, 1995; El-
der-Vass, 2010; Sayer, 2000) and indeed other social scientists (e.g. Lawson, 1997).
Although both realists and anti-realists have sometimes seen critical realism as
being in conflict with social constructionism, there are good reasons for thinking
that this is not the case. Or, to be more precise, there are good reasons to think that
it is not in conflict with some varieties of constructionism. On the contrary, I will
argue, a realist constructionism can be a more coherent and potentially a more
valuable constructionism.
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1 This paper is based on a talk given at the University Institute of Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL) on 11 May
2012. I would like to thank Maria das Dores Guerreiro for the kind invitation to speak and the
audience for their stimulating questions and comments.
2 Apoint that is often made with regard to Foucault, for example (Rouse, 1994: 102; Taylor, 1986: 94).
The paper begins by saying a little more about critical realism’s general ap-
proach to ontology and social ontology, and developing the argument that it is in-
deed compatible with constructionism. Indeed it provides us with tools that enable
us to develop a more coherent form of constructionism: more coherent because in
this form the causal mechanisms that lie behind social construction can be analysed
and understood, and only constructionist claims consistent with those mecha-
nisms are accepted. The second section illuminates and concretises this argument
by considering the case of discourse, a force that is often regarded as contributing
to the process of social construction. Engaging with Michel Foucault’s account of
discourse, this section examines how we might develop a realist causal account of
its influence. Finally, the third section concretises the argument in a different di-
mension by considering one of the many types of thing that have been seen as
socially constructed: the subject. It criticises Judith Butler’s account of the construc-
tion of the subject and offers an alternative realist model of the construction of the
subject. This is a model that is compatible with recognising the reality of agency:
the reality of human beings as causally significant in their own right. The paper
thus combines and highlights some key elements from my recent work, and more
detailed versions of many of its arguments can be found there (notably in El-
der-Vass, 2007; 2010; 2011; 2012).
Realism and constructionism
There is space here for only the briefest of introductions to critical realism. Perhaps
the best starting point for such an introduction is critical realism’s understanding
of causality and its significance for the social sciences. For realists the social world,
like the rest of the natural world, is driven by causal processes, and therefore social
science is at least partly concerned with seeking to explain the causal interactions
that produce social events (Bhaskar, 1998 [1979]; Elder-Vass, 2010). Critical realists
argue that all events are caused by multiple interacting causal powers (Bhaskar,
1975), including for example the powers of individual persons and the powers that
we attribute to social structures (Archer, 1995). Even this brief statement already
produces quite a different sense of causality than the positivist or empiricist ac-
count of cause, because the combination of powers that is present on any one occa-
sion is always contingent, and so causal powers are only ever tendencies: their
characteristic effects are not always realised as they may sometimes be overcome
by the influence of other contingently present powers. Causal powers, therefore,
rarely and perhaps never produce the exceptionless empirical regularities that em-
piricist thinkers like David Hume identify as the form of causality (Bhaskar, 1975:
33-35; Elder-Vass, 2010: 40-43; Hume, 1977 [1748]).
For realists, these causal powers are emergent properties. As I interpret this
claim, this means that they are properties or powers that are possessed by things,
using this word rather loosely to include any persistent assembly of parts. They are
emergent in the sense that they are powers that would not exist if the parts con-
cerned were not organised into a certain type of whole. They are therefore a
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product of the particular organisation of the parts that is characteristic of wholes of
this type (Elder-Vass, 2010: chapter 2). This point is most simply explained by us-
ing a non-social example, before we move on later to more sociological cases. Con-
sider the example of a laser pointer, composed of a plastic case, a button, an electric
circuit, a battery, and a laser diode. When these parts are organised into the form of
a laser pointer, the pointer has the power to shine a focussed beam of light at a dis-
tant point when the button is pressed. This is a power that depends on the parts but
also on the organisation that turns them into a laser pointer, and because of the lat-
ter it is a power that is not possessed by the parts unless they are organised into a la-
ser pointer. It is therefore an emergent power of the pointer, a new power that is
produced when the parts are organised into this form.
Philosophers of science have debated emergence at some length because it
offers an alternative to reductionist ways of thinking about causality (id., ibid.:
53-58). Eliminative reductionists argue that there are no emergent properties be-
cause the apparent powers of higher level wholes are always really produced by
the effects of their lower level parts. Some emergentists have gone to the other ex-
treme and argued that emergent properties cannot be explained at all. I offer an
intermediate view. On the one hand, I argue, emergent powers can be explained
by learning the mechanism that produces them: the process of interaction be-
tween the parts that produces the power. On the other hand, however, such expla-
nations are not eliminative reductions: if we can explain a power in this way it
does not cease to be emergent, it does not cease to be a power of the whole thing,
and it does not become a power of the parts, since it is power that does not exist
unless the parts are organised into the form of the larger entity — in this case the
laser pointer.
Arguments like this become useful to social scientists only if and when they
can be applied to the social world. For example, realists have argued that we can ex-
plain individual human agents as entities with emergent causal powers of their
own, powers that arise from their physical structure: an argument that becomes so-
ciological when we recognise that our physical structures (most obviously our neu-
rological structures, but also muscles, for example) are themselves influenced
causally by our social experience (idem, 2007; 2010: 89-98). This is an argument that
will be relevant to the discussion of subjects in part three below.
Equally important is the case of social structures. Consider two types of so-
cial structure: organisations and norm circles (the latter concept is developed in El-
der-Vass, 2010: chapter 6; and 2012: chapter 2). Both are social entities, composed
of people (and potentially other parts too), which have powers that those people
would not have if they were not organised into these entities. An orchestra, for ex-
ample, is a relatively simple organisation composed of musicians and instruments.
An orchestra has the power to produce harmonious music, a power that those musi-
cians would not have as individuals, a power they would not have without the set of
relations and commitments that turns them, collectively, into an orchestra. This is
therefore an emergent causal power of the organisation. Similarly, I have argued that
we can best explain normative social institutions as the product of social entities
called norm circles: groups of people who share a commitment to endorse and enforce
TOWARDS A REALIST SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 11
SOCIOLOGIA, PROBLEMAS E PRÁTICAS, n.º 70, 2012, pp. 9-24. DOI:10.7458/SPP2012701208
a particular norm. Norm circles will be discussed in a little more detail in section two
below, as part of a realist causal account of discourse.
This kind of account of social structures is valuable as a response to method-
ological individualism, the form of eliminative reductionism with which we are fa-
miliar in sociology (idem, 2010: 83-84). It does not, however, lead to an equally
unbalanced methodological collectivism. Instead, in combination with the broader
critical realist account of causality, it enables us to recognise that both social struc-
tures and individual agents have emergent causal powers, and that social events,
on the model of causality introduced above, are the product of multiple interacting
causal powers, including the powers of both individual agents and social struc-
tures, and indeed other material objects.
A characteristic feature of social constructionist arguments it that they assign a
critical role in the process of construction to language, discourse, and/or culture. Of-
ten, invoking some variation of the interpretive tradition, this is linked to the claim
that these cannot be given causal explanations. Instead, it may be suggested, they
can only be interpreted or understood using hermeneutic methods. Realists, by con-
trast, are open to the need for interpretive work for making sense of the meanings of
language, discourse, and culture, but do not see this as posing an obstacle to includ-
ing these forces in causal accounts. A realist social constructionism, in other words,
would see language, discourse and culture as products of interacting causal powers
and also, potentially, as causal forces themselves. This opens up the prospect of see-
ing social construction as a real causal process, or a family of such processes. By de-
veloping a social ontology of language, discourse, and culture we can then develop
an understanding of the entities, powers, and mechanisms at work. This in turn
should help us to distinguish between viable constructionist claims that are compati-
ble with plausible accounts of such causal processes and non-viable claims that are
not. The present paper is a contribution to such an enterprise.
I should stress, however, that mine is by no means the first contribution.
Bhaskar, for example, stresses that social structures are concept dependent (Bhaskar,
1998 [1979]: 38), thus linking interpretive to structural questions, and has questioned
suggestions that there is a conflict between realism and constructionism (idem, 1993:
186). And a range of realist thinkers have argued that realism is compatible with
moderate forms of social constructionism while rejecting the anti-realist forms of
constructionism referred to above (including, for example, Joseph and Roberts, 2004:
5; Mingers, 1999; Sayer, 2000: 62-63; Sewell, 1992: 12; Sismondo, 1996: 2; Smith, 2010:
119-122). Broadly speaking, this paper builds on the distinction that these authors
have developed between moderate forms of social constructionism that are compati-
ble with realism and more radical forms that are neither compatible with realism nor
causally plausible.
Discourse after Foucault
The work of Foucault has sometimes been given a radical constructionist interpreta-
tion, but many realists have suggested that his work is in fact compatible with a
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realist view of the social world (e.g. Al-Amoudi, 2007; Hardy, 2010; Joseph, 2004;
Pearce and Woodiwiss, 2001; Sealey and Carter, 2004: 46; and papers by Woodiwiss,
Day, and Frauley in Frauley and Pearce, 2007). Rather than debating Foucault’s in-
tentions, however, this section will draw on Foucault’s account of discourse and de-
velop it in a realist direction. Foucault’s work on discourse has two features that
make it a promising starting point. First, although Foucault may have resisted use of
the word “cause” there is a strong sense in his work that discourse shapes our social
world in something like a causal way. Second, his reflections in The Archaeology of
Knowledge remain the most thorough and coherent analysis of the nature of dis-
course to be found in the literature (Foucault, 2002 [1969]).
Nevertheless, it remains extremely unclear what mechanism might be re-
sponsible for the effects that Foucault claims for discourse, and in particular, it re-
mains unclear how this might relate to the contributions of human actors. In a
way what Foucault faces here is the classic sociological problem of structure and
agency, a problem that has been a central focus of critical realist work in sociology
(e.g. Archer, 1995; Elder-Vass, 2010; Porpora, 1998). What this paper seeks to do,
then, is to reuse some of Foucault’s materials in a realist theory of discourse that
also draws on realist understandings of structure and agency, understandings
that as we have seen are in turn informed by critical realism’s broader ontology of
causality. The product is a theory that recognises that discourse has a causal
power, but also that subjects and other social structures have causal powers of
their own, and a theory in which we can make sense of how these causal powers
relate to each other.
For Foucault, discourse consists primarily of statements and discursive forma-
tions. Foucault approaches the definition of statements partly by considering their
relationship to sentences. Statements bear some relation to the content of sentences,
but they are not the same thing as sentences, and there is a certain ambivalence in
Foucault’s account of the relation between the two. The obvious reading is that a
statement can be equated to the meaning of a sentence. Thus, for example, Foucault
argues that if we see a notice that is translated into several languages, or if we hear a
speech and its simultaneous translation, the original sentence and its translations
do not constitute different statements but rather are simply different instances of
the same statement (Foucault, 2002 [1969]: 116-117). What seems to be preserved
between these different sentences is indeed the meaning, and I shall interpret the
concept of a statement in this way, but it is worth noting that Foucault is somewhat
resistant to this interpretation. This may be a consequence of a desire to avoid the
complexities of hermeneutic methodology. Foucault is, primarily, studying past
statements, but has no interest in potential multiplicities of interpretation of those
statements (id., ibid.: 31). His interest is in how those statements were regulated in
the period in which they were produced, and today’s interpretations are irrelevant
to this question; it is the question of how they were understood by contemporaries
that is significant for the process of regulation, but it is the regulation that Foucault
is interested in, not the interpretation.
Foucault’s discussion of translation also prompts another important point:
statements are not a linguistic phenomenon. They are of course expressed using
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language, but the language itself is not what Foucault is interested in. Foucault is
interested in the ways in which what is said is regulated (the content of our state-
ments), not in the ways in which how it is said is regulated (the language we use to
express them), and these two issues are governed by two different sets of rules or
norms.3 Linguistic rules govern features like vocabulary, grammar and pronuncia-
tion, but Foucault’s interest is in discursive rules: rules that govern what can be said
and what should not be said.
It is sets of such rules that constitute the second element of discourse: discur-
sive formations. These are sets of rules about what statements can be made in a given
social context, rules that Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 70) call “principles of a rar-
efaction” because they tend to cause the things that are actually said to cluster
within a limited subset of the things that it would be linguistically possible to say.
Discourse, for Foucault, then, is some combination of the statements that are
made and the rules that govern those statements. But what is the relation between
these two components, and how could the discursive rules produce the effect of
regulating the statements that are produced? Foucault has some clues to offer.
These rules, he says, are to be found and operate “not only in the mind… but in dis-
course itself” (Foucault, 2002 [1969]: 69). This, of course, implies that they do oper-
ate in the mind, but not only there, so here he seems to be offering some place to the
human individual in the process of reproduction of discourse, and yet at the same
time he rejects a purely subjectivist account of discourse. These rules, he also says,
operate “without reference to a cogito” but “in the totality of things said” (id., ibid.:
138). The implication of the first half of this statement would seem to be that they
are lodged in our brains and operate on our discursive acts but without being un-
der the control of an autonomous self. The implication of the second is that the
mechanism of their reproduction is driven in some way by the accumulation of
past statements. But this is as far as Foucault takes us in the direction of explaining
the causal mechanism at work. Discourse itself, it seems (in an argument that paral-
lels the work of Niklas Luhmann), affects the production of further discourse, but it
is not at all clear how.
For a realist this story is frustrating: Foucault is telling us that discourse
makes a difference to the social world, but stops short of explaining how this could
possibly be the case. Can we improve on this story? Can we develop it into a coher-
ent causal explanation?
This paper argues that the general points about ontology and cause discussed
in the previous section can be applied to this case: that we can explain the causal in-
fluence of discursive rules as the consequence of an emergent causal power of so-
cial entities. Discursive rules are norms of a kind: norms about what we should say,
write or think. It may therefore be possible to explain them in the same terms as
other normative social institutions: in terms of causal powers of the social entities I
have called norm circles (Elder-Vass, 2010: chapter 6). A norm circle is a group of
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3 For the purposes of this paper I treat rules and norms as interchangeable concepts, but they have
slightly different connotations and there are some problematic features of common academic
usages of the concept of rules in particular. For more on this, see Elder-Vass (2012: 47-54).
people who are committed to endorsing and enforcing a specific norm. Every
norm, I argue, has such a group of people standing behind it. They criticise and
punish those who fail to observe the norm concerned, and they praise and reward
those who do observe it. As a result of this sanctioning behaviour, individuals ex-
posed to the influence of the norm circle tend to develop dispositions to conform to
the norm. These dispositions, of course, are only tendencies. Like other causal
powers, these ones may be frustrated on any particular occasion by countervailing
powers. Thus, for example, my tendency to step aside to let someone pass may be
frustrated if I am in a close-packed crowd that prevents me from doing so. Thus the
norm circle, a social entity with an emergent causal power arising from a process of
interaction between its members, operates through its members to exercise that
causal power: the power to create a tendency for affected individuals to conform to
the norm concerned.
Discursive rules may operate in just the same way as norms more generally:
they have a causal impact on individuals as a result of the influence of a discursive
norm circle, a norm circle committed to the discursive rule concerned (Elder-Vass,
2012: 153-157). Thus, for example, there is a set of discursive rules about what can
be said and what should not be said in articles in academic journals, and these rules
are causally effective because there is a group of people — primarily journal editors
and reviewers — who are committed to enforcing them and who have the power to
sanction academic writers in support of these rules. Similarly, there have been his-
torically variable rules about how we may and how we should not speak about
madness, which has had profound effects on the ways in which the mad have been
treated in our societies, as Foucault has demonstrated (2001 [1961]).
This way of thinking about discursive rules, I suggest, offers a productive syn-
thesis between Foucault’s work on discourse and realist social ontology. In particu-
lar, it solves the causal problems that undermine Foucault’s account of discourse.
Now, the causal processes and mechanisms that make it possible for discursive rules
to affect us are clear. There are groups committed to these rules that enforce them.
Furthermore, the role of the individual subject is clear: individuals tend to act in con-
formity with the rules because the pressure from discursive norm circles leads them
to develop dispositions to comply with the corresponding rules, but they only tend to
act in conformity with them, because other causal powers also affect them (e.g. other
norms, chemical influences on their emotions, their own prior decisions about their
projects in life, etc.). Thus we get general conformity with the rules because there is a
real social force that backs up those rules, but transgression and change are also
possible, whether as a result of deliberate innovation or as an unintended conse-
quence of non-compliance, because there are also other social forces (and indeed
physical forces and individual reflexive agency) influencing our behaviour. Discur-
sive constructionism, it turns out, is not just compatible with a realist ontology, but
stronger and clearer as a result of being combined with it.
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The constructed subject
We may examine the issues raised by discursive constructionism by considering
some of the arguments that have been offered regarding the construction of one
specific type of object. Let us take the example of the subject. There is a certain apt-
ness in examining this case, not only because it has been a prime site for construc-
tionist arguments, but also because of the significance of the subject’s role in the
debates discussed above on the nature of discursive power itself.
The concept of the subject is closely linked to the concept of agency, but its us-
age within the poststructuralist tradition has enmeshed it in a network of connota-
tions that convey a certain scepticism about the traditional concept of agency. The
idea that our subjectivity is socially constructed has come to be associated with the
idea that our subjectivity is in some way inauthentic or compromised: that our sub-
jectivity is not what it might appear to be; that the conventional notions of agency
and the subject, in other words, refer to something that is not real. Yet, I would like
to suggest, this implicit dismissal of the human capacity for agency on the basis of
arguments for the social construction of the subject is not tenable. Instead, I will ar-
gue, we can develop a more moderate realist constructionism about the subject, a
constructionism that is compatible with the possession of an element of autonomy
by individual human agents.
One difficulty in this debate is that the concept of the subject is used to refer to
many different aspects of the human individual. Elsewhere I have identified eight
different usages that are relevant to this debate (Elder-Vass, 2012: 184-187); let us
focus here on just four of these, and some of the relations between them. First, we
have what we may call the agentic subject: the person who is capable of reflection
and choice. This is a version of the concept of the subject that I will defend. Second,
there is the Cartesian subject, the subject as a free-floating rational mind, more or
less disconnected from the material world and with universal qualities that are in-
dependent of any social history. This is the concept of the subject that is commonly
attributed to Descartes, a concept of the subject that is widely rejected. Third, we
have the authorised subject: a person who is recognised as being authorised to make
non-trivial decisions. Much of the feminist debate on subjectivity has been driven
by the denial of this status to women.
Early attacks on the concept of the subject by Althusser and Foucault were
concerned with the relation between such concepts and a fourth one, the political
subject: a person who is subject to political power, a subject of a state or sovereign.
Althusser and Foucault, in their different ways, argued that our sense of being
agentic subjects, free agents, is produced by ideology (for Althusser) or a discur-
sive formation (for Foucault) as part of a process of ensuring that we accept our sta-
tus as political subjects (Althusser, 1994 [1971]; Foucault, 1983). Our sense of
freedom, these arguments imply, is historically contingent, a recent product of an
ideology or discursive formation that secures our complicity in our own domina-
tion by enticing us to believe that we choose it freely. It is this sense of subjectivity,
Foucault seems to argue, that in some future historical period may be “erased, like
a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault, 2002 [1966]: 422).
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This is a very odd argument. Why would it be necessary to persuade us that
we choose our subjection freely if there was not already some danger that we might
refuse to comply with power? And if there is such a danger, doesn’t that mean that
our autonomy pre-exists the supposed moment of construction of our subjectivity?
And indeed Foucault himself is ultimately committed to the need for resistance
and to the existence of some capacity to resist. So perhaps the agentic subject is
more than a discursively/ideologically produced illusion after all. We could still ac-
cept, of course, that the particular form of our understanding of subjectivity is so-
cially constructed, but the undercurrent of scepticism about agentic subjectivity
itself in the poststructuralist tradition cannot be sustained on this basis.
Perhaps the most important recent expression of that scepticism has come
from Judith Butler. In her debate with Seyla Benhabib, Butler has attacked the idea
of the agentic subject (Benhabib, 1995a; 1995b; Butler, 1995a; 1995b). Butler ques-
tions the possibility of knowing anything except through discourse and therefore
questions the idea of a subject outside discourse (Butler, 2006 [1990]: 202). Instead,
she suggests, we should see the subject as a linguistic site or category (idem, 1995b:
135). People become subjects, she says, only by occupying the site of the subject, as
speaker or addressee, in speech acts, which are therefore performative of being a
subject (in a sense of performativity that is drawn from the work of J. L. Austin —
see Butler, 1997: 10-11; 1995b: 134). This perhaps makes most sense if we read sub-
ject in the sense of authorised subject defined above: people become authorised sub-
jects (or not) on the basis of a sedimentation of discursive acts. Butler, as far as I am
aware, however, tends to read the concept of the subject rather more loosely and
widely than this, and I have suggested elsewhere that her critique of Benhabib de-
pends heavily on various conflations between different concepts of the subject. In
particular, her attack on the agentic subject is constructed largely by conflating it
with the Cartesian subject, as if these two concepts were one and the same, when in
fact Benhabib is defending the agentic but not the Cartesian subject (Elder-Vass,
2012: 192-193).
For Butler, then, the subject is the outcome of a linguistic process of performative
construal that occurs during speech acts (Butler, 2006 [1990]: 195). One implication of
her argument seems to be that we are only subjects during these speech acts, and that
the subject is recreated in every such act, as if our bodies were empty shells between
one speech act and the next. But, she insists, there is also an element of iterability to
such performatives: a permanent possibility of realisation of the subject position that is
built into the structure of our language (idem, 1993: 13; 1995a: 47; 1995b: 134). This pos-
sibility, she argues, arises from the linguistic conventions that reserve a place for the
subject in our patterns of discourse, rules that require us to refer to persons and locate
them as actors in our statements (idem, 1995b: 134). But although Butler claims that
this retains a place for agency in her social theory, it is an agency that seems to be
stripped of any place for individual reflexivity or autonomy, and indeed it is hard to
see what opportunity such agents could ever have for altering the discourses in which
they are embedded. Butler does not seem to escape from the problem that faced
Foucault in his earlier work: the problem of an account of subjectivity that is so much a
product of external forces that the capacity for critique and resistance is inconceivable,
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while on the other hand her own critical political agenda depends upon the existence
of such a capacity.
Realism and the constructed subject
For realists, the subject is something more than a position in discourse. For realists,
we are real physical human beings capable of reflection and choice (Archer, 2003;
Shilling, 2005). These capabilities are emergent properties of living human bodies,
arising from the composition and structure of those bodies, including their brains
(Elder-Vass, 2010: 89-93). These are capabilities that continue to exist from moment
to moment independently of any need for discursive speech acts, though the form
they take is certainly influenced by prior such acts. It is the plasticity of the human
brain, the ways in which its neural structures are constantly reshaped by our expe-
riences, whether discursive or practical, that makes it possible for prior discursive
acts to influence subsequent discursive structures. As our brains are influenced by
the discursive pressures exerted on us by the discursive norm circles that form an
important part of our social context, we develop new or subtly altered dispositions,
including dispositions to exert normative pressures ourselves. This is the transmis-
sion belt that enables prior practice to influence future practice, but any consis-
tency in such influences depends on the existence of groups of people with
systematically similar normative commitments.
The consequence is that we have a capacity to reflect and decide that exists in-
dependently of any particular socialisation, but that the workings of that capacity
are influenced by our knowledge, beliefs and dispositions, which alter according to
our experience. A further consequence is that as agents we can be influenced by so-
cial structure, although different theorists emphasise different pathways through
which this can occur — for Archer, for example, the pathway is the knowledge we
have of our social context; and for Bourdieu, it is the dispositions that we may ac-
quire unthinkingly from our context (Elder-Vass, 2010: 99-108). The implication is
that we are agentic subjects — reflective, decision making individuals, even if at
times we act unreflectively — but not Cartesian subjects — we are embodied, shaped
to some extent by our social context, and we are not free floating asocial rational
minds.
Now this, I suggest, is compatible with a moderate constructionism about
subjects. Although we have the capacity to be agentic subjects independently of
any particular social context, what kind of subject each of us becomes does depend
on the processes of social construction. This is most striking when we consider the
case of authorised subjects. The kinds of people we are accepted as, and the kinds of
actions, whether discursive or practical, that we are authorised to perform, depend
upon performative acts that enact social norms — norms of gender, class, and so-
cial role, for example. And here we may connect the argument back to what was
said above about discourse. The place of the subject in statements, the issue of what
may or may not be said about subjects and indeed of who may qualify as an author-
ised subject in discourse, is certainly influential in shaping the kinds of subjects
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that we are, the kinds of freedom for example that we feel able to enact. The place of
the subject in statements is in turn a product of discursive formations — what But-
ler calls linguistic conventions — but this is not the end of the matter. Those forma-
tions or conventions are normative, and they do not exist in some free floating
abstract form, nor in some miraculously similar form in a multitude of individual
heads. They are the product of real social groups, of discursive norm circles, who
provide the systematic pressures that sustain the norms concerned within the
population.
This kind of constructionism still allows us space for critiques of hegemonic
conventions, and thus for some at least of Butler’s political agenda. But it also
solves the problem of resistance in poststructuralist theory: as real material beings
with the capacity to make decisions that are only partly shaped by our social con-
text we have the capacity to do otherwise than might otherwise seem to be dictated
by hegemonic conventions. Such possibilities multiply when other norms develop
that may be in conflict with hegemonic ones, and we are obliged to make choices
between them.4 The realist constructed subject thus has the autonomy of the
agentic subject: not the pure autonomy of the Cartesian subject but enough auton-
omy to make resistance and change possible. The extent and form of that auton-
omy, of course, may vary depending on the historical conditions, which influence
the range of options within which we may have realistic possibilities of making
choices as well as the kinds of people that we believe ourselves to be.
In saying so, we open up further vistas. The causal chains at work in society
do not start or end with discourse and the normative processes that lie behind it.
The influence of norm circles itself is the result of a causal history, and when we
investigate the relation between individual agents and norm circles we see only
one part of that multiply determined causal history. In giving a fuller account of
that causal history we must be conscious of the wider social powers that influence
our normative institutions. Behind the influence of ideology, for example, Marx-
ists see the power of capital. In abandoning ideology for discourse, Foucault
sidelined the question of what social powers lie behind discourse, although he
later took up this question from a rather different angle through his engagement
with the power/knowledge relation. Perhaps there is an element of autonomy in
the discursive circuit, as thinkers like Luhmann would have us believe, but our
discursive norms are also heavily shaped by other forms of social power —
capital, governments, media corporations, and social movements, for example.
A truly critical constructionism will also need to engage with their influence. To
do so in any detail, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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4 For an interesting discussion of the relation between “hegemonic norm circles” and “norm cir-
cles of resistance” see Cresswell, Karimova and Brock (forthcoming).
Conclusion
This paper has argued that social constructionism must be combined with a critical
realist social ontology if it is to offer a coherent approach to developing critical social
theory. If social constructionism is to be plausible we need an account of how social
construction actually works, an account that is consistent with our understanding of
the material world of which we are part. Imperialistic constructionisms that see ev-
erything as constructed and that turn away from the reality of our world are ulti-
mately self-defeating, both because they are impossible to reconcile with what we
know of our sheer materiality, and also because they make it impossible to justify
substantive ethical views that enable us to criticise what exists.
This paper has sought both to outline and to illustrate the view that we can
productively combine a more moderate constructionism with a realist ontology.
We can, for example, develop plausible and coherent causal accounts of the in-
fluence of discourse on our dispositions, beliefs and actions, by seeing that in-
fluence as a causal power of the discursive norm circles that endorse and
enforce discursive rules. The ontology advocated here also enables us to make a
clear and plausible connection between such social entities and the individual
human agents that make them up. Those individuals are independently mate-
rial people with casual powers of their own, yet they are also shaped and influ-
enced by discursive pressures. Realists can therefore accept that subjectivity is
socially constructed in the moderate sense advocated in this paper without de-
nying the reality of the agentic subject, as more extreme constructionists like
Butler seem to do.5
The argument of this paper has focused on the cases of discourse and the sub-
ject, but similar arguments can be made about language, culture and knowledge as
mechanisms of construction, and about many other potential objects of construc-
tion. Further discussion of many of these, and indeed more in depth discussion of
some of the themes of this paper can be found in Elder-Vass (2012). In all of the
cases I have considered, it appears to be both possible and productive to combine a
realist social ontology with moderate constructionist theory. Realists, I suggest,
should be social constructionists; social constructionists should be realists; and so-
cial scientists in general should be both.
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Resumo/abstract/résumé/resumen
Para um construtivismo social realista
O construtivismo social tem sido muitas vezes visto como incompatível com abor-
dagens realistas do mundo social. Este artigo defende que o realismo crítico é total-
mente compatível com versões moderadas do construtivismo social e que, de facto,
lhe fornece maior suporte ontológico do que as abordagens antirrealistas, frequen-
temente associadas a versões mais extremas do construtivismo social. O artigo de-
monstra esta teoria oferecendo uma descrição realista de como o discurso pode
sustentar processos de construção social. Este argumento é, assim, aplicado ao caso
do sujeito, numa proposta enquadrada como crítica da descrição performativa do
sujeito de Judith Butler.
Palavras-chave construção social, realismo crítico, discurso, sujeitos, Foucault.
Towards a realist social constructionism
Social constructionism has often been seen as incompatible with realist approaches
to the social world. This paper argues that critical realism is thoroughly compatible
with moderate versions of social constructionism and indeed provides stronger
ontological backing for it than the anti-realist approaches that are often associated
with more extreme versions of social constructionism. The paper illustrates the ar-
gument by offering a realist account of how discourse may underpin processes of
social construction. This is then applied to the case of the subject, an application
that is framed as a critique of Judith Butler’s performative account of the subject.
Keywords social construction, critical realism, discourse, subjects, Foucault.
Pour un constructivisme social réaliste
Le constructivisme social a souvent été vu comme incompatible avec les approches
réalistes du monde social. Cet article soutient que le réalisme critique est totale-
ment compatible avec des versions modérées du constructivisme social et que, en
fait, il lui apporte un plus grand support ontologique que les approches antiréalis-
tes, souvent associées aux versions plus extrêmes du constructivisme social.
L’article démontre cette théorie en proposant une description réaliste de la façon
dont le discours peut soutenir des processus de construction sociale. Cet argument
est ainsi appliqué au cas du sujet, selon une proposition encadrée en tant que criti-
que de la description performative du sujet, de Judith Butler.
Mots-clés construction sociale, réalisme critique, discours, sujets, Foucault.
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Para un constructivismo social realista
El constructivismo social ha sido visto muchas veces como incompatible con abor-
dajes realistas del mundo social. Este artículo defiende que el realismo crítico es to-
talmente compatible con versiones moderadas del constructivismo social y que de
hecho le otorga mayor soporte ontológico que los abordajes anti-realistas, frecuen-
temente asociadas a versiones más extremas del constructivismo social. El artículo
demuestra esta teoría ofreciendo una descripción realista de como el discurso pue-
de sostener procesos de construcción social. Este argumento es, así, aplicado al
caso del sujeto, en una propuesta encuadrada como crítica de la descripción del
performance del sujeto, de Judith Butler.
Palabras-clave construcción social, realismo crítico, discurso, sujetos, Foucault.
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